Author: Street Cop Training

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)

Written by Street Cop Training on April 12, 2022. Posted in Case Law.

Syllabus

On the strength of a complaint for a search warrant based on an informant’s statements that he had observed tinfoil packets on the person of a bartender and behind the bar at a certain tavern and that he had been advised by the bartender that the latter would have heroin for sale on a certain date, a judge of an Illinois state court issued a warrant authorizing the search of the tavern and the person of the bartender for “evidence of the offense of possession of a controlled substance.” Upon entering the tavern to execute the warrant, police officers announced their purpose and advised those present that they were going to conduct a “cursory search for weapons.” The officer who searched the customers felt what he described as “a cigarette pack with objects in it” in his first pat-down of appellant, one of the customers. The officer did not then remove this pack from appellant’s pocket but, after patting down other customers, returned to appellant, frisked him again, retrieved the cigarette pack from his pants pocket, and found inside it six tinfoil packets containing heroin. After appellant was indicted for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, he filed a pretrial motion to suppress the contraband seized from his person at the tavern. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the search had been conducted under the authority of an Illinois statute which empowers law enforcement officers executing a search warrant to detain and search any person found on the premises in order to protect themselves from attack or to prevent the disposal or concealment of anything described in the warrant. Appellant was convicted, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the Illinois statute was not unconstitutional in its application to the facts of this case.

Held: The searches of appellant and the seizure of what was in his pocket contravened the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 444 U. S. 90-96.

(a) When the search warrant was issued, the authorities had no probable cause to believe that any person found in the tavern, aside from the bartender, would be violating the law. The complaint for the warrant did not allege that the tavern was frequented by persons illegally purchasing drugs or that the informant had ever seen a patron of the tavern purchase drugs from the bartender or any other person.

Page 444 U. S. 86

And probable cause to search appellant was still absent when the police executed the warrant; upon entering the tavern, the police did not recognize appellant and had no reason to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit any offense. The police did possess a warrant based on probable cause to search the tavern where appellant happened to be when the warrant was executed, but a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 392 U. S. 62-63. Although the warrant gave the officers authority to search the premises and the bartender, it gave them no authority to invade the constitutional protections possessed individually by the tavern’s customers. Pp. 444 U. S. 90-92.

(b) Nor was the action of the police constitutionally permissible on the theory that the first search of appellant constituted a reasonable frisk for weapons under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, and yielded probable cause to believe that appellant was carrying narcotics, thus justifying the second search for which no warrant was required in light of the exigencies of the situation coupled with the ease with which appellant could have disposed of the illegal substance. A reasonable belief that a person is armed and presently dangerous must form the predicate to a pat-down of the person for weapons. Here, the State is unable to articulate any specific fact that would have justified a police officer at the scene in even suspecting that appellant was armed and dangerous. Pp. 444 U. S. 92-93.

(c) The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments will not be construed to permit evidence searches of persons who, at the commencement of the search, are on “compact” premises subject to a search warrant, even where the police have a “reasonable belief” that such persons “are connected with” drug trafficking and “may be concealing or carrying away the contraband.” Cf. United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581. Pp. 444 U. S. 94-96.

58 Ill.App.3d 57, 373 N.E.2d 1013, reversed and remanded.

STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 444 U. S. 96. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 444 U. S. 98.

Page 444 U. S. 87

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)

Written by Street Cop Training on April 12, 2022. Posted in Case Law.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WYOMING

No. 98-184. Argued January 12, 1999-Decided April 5, 1999

During a routine traffic stop, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer noticed a hypodermic syringe in the driver’s shirt pocket, which the driver admitted using to take drugs. The officer then searched the passenger compartment for contraband, removing and searching what respondent, a passenger in the car, claimed was her purse. He found drug paraphernalia there and arrested respondent on drug charges. The trial court denied her motion to suppress all evidence from the purse as the fruit of an unlawful search, holding that the officer had probable cause to search the car for contraband, and, by extension, any containers therein that could hold such contraband. Respondent was convicted. In reversing, the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that an officer with probable cause to search a vehicle may search all containers that might conceal the object of the search; but, if the officer knows or should know that a container belongs to a passenger who is not suspected of criminal activity, then the container is outside the scope of the search unless someone had the opportunity to conceal contraband within it to avoid detection. Applying that rule here, the court concluded that the search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Held: Police officers with probable cause to search a car, as in this case, may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search. In determining whether a particular governmental action violates the Fourth Amendment, this Court inquires first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under common law when the Amendment was framed, see, e. g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927, 931. Where that inquiry yields no answer, the Court must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional reasonableness standards by balancing an individual’s privacy interests against legitimate governmental interests, see, e. g., Vernonia School Dist. -‘+ 7 J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 652-653. This Court has concluded that the Framers would have regarded as reasonable the warrantless search of a car that police had probable cause to believe contained contraband, Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, as well as the warrantless search of containers within the automobile, United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798. Neither Ross nor the historical evidence it relied upon admits of a distinction based on ownership. The analytical principle underlying Ross’s rule is also fully consistent with the balance of this

296

Syllabus

Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Even if the historical evidence were equivocal, the balancing of the relative interests weighs decidedly in favor of searching a passenger’s belongings. Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property they transport in cars. See, e. g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590. The degree of intrusiveness of a package search upon personal privacy and personal dignity is substantially less than the degree of intrusiveness of the body searches at issue in United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, and Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85. In contrast to the passenger’s reduced privacy expectations, the governmental interest in effective law enforcement would be appreciably impaired without the ability to search the passenger’s belongings, since an automobile’s ready mobility creates the risk that evidence or contraband will be permanently lost while a warrant is obtained, California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386; since a passenger may have an interest in concealing evidence of wrongdoing in a common enterprise with the driver, cf. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 413-414; and since a criminal might be able to hide contraband in a passenger’s belongings as readily as in other containers in the car, see, e. g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98, 102. The Wyoming Supreme Court’s “passenger property” rule would be unworkable in practice. Finally, an exception from the historical practice described in Ross protecting only a passenger’s property, rather than property belonging to anyone other than the driver, would be less sensible than the rule that a package may be searched, whether or not its owner is present as a passenger or otherwise, because it might contain the object of the search. Pp. 299-307.

956 P. 2d 363, reversed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O’CONNOR, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and BREYER, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 307. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined, post, p.309.

Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General of Wyoming, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Gay Woodhouse, Acting Attorney General, and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Barbara McDowell argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Robinson, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)

Written by Street Cop Training on April 12, 2022. Posted in Case Law.

Syllabus

In a trial in a Federal District Court without a jury, petitioners were convicted of fraudulent and knowing transportation and concealment of illegally imported heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §174. Although the Court of Appeals held that the arrests of both petitioners without warrants were illegal, because not based on “probable cause” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment nor “reasonable grounds” within the meaning of the Narcotics Control Act of 1956, it affirmed their convictions, notwithstanding the admission in evidence over their timely objections of (1) statements made orally by petitioner Toy in his bedroom at the time of his arrest; (2) heroin surrendered to the agents by a third party as a result of those statements; and (3) unsigned statements made by each petitioner several days after his arrest, and after being lawfully arraigned and released on his own recognizance. The Court of Appeals held that these items were not the fruits of the illegal arrests, and, therefore, were properly admitted in evidence.

Held:

1. On the record in this case, there was neither reasonable grounds nor probable cause for Toy’s arrest, since the information upon which it was based was too vague and came from too untested a source to accept it as probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant; and this defect was not cured by the fact that Toy fled when a supposed customer at his door early in the morning revealed that he was a narcotics agent. Pp. 371 U. S. 479-484.

2. On the record in this case, the statements made by Toy in his bedroom at the time of his unlawful arrest were the fruits of the agents’ unlawful action, and they should have been excluded from evidence. Pp. 371 U. S. 484-487.

3. The narcotics taken from a third party as a result of statements made by Toy at the time of his arrest were likewise fruits of the unlawful arrest, and they should not have been admitted as evidence against Toy. Pp. 371 U. S. 487-488.

Page 371 U. S. 472

4. After exclusion of the foregoing items of improperly admitted evidence, the only proofs remaining to sustain Toy’s conviction are his and his codefendant’s unsigned statements; any admissions of guilt in Toy’s statement require corroboration; no reference to Toy in his codefendant’s statement constitutes admissible evidence corroborating any admission by Toy, and Toy’s conviction must be set aside for lack of competent evidence to support it. Pp. 371 U. S. 488-491.

5. In view of the fact that, after his unlawful arrest, petitioner Wong Sun had been lawfully arraigned and released on his own recognizance and had returned voluntarily several days later when he made his unsigned statement, the connection between his unlawful arrest and the making of that statement was so attenuated that the unsigned statement was not the fruit of the unlawful arrest and, therefore, it was properly admitted in evidence. P. 371 U. S. 491.

6. The seizure of the narcotics admitted in evidence invaded no right of privacy of person or premises which would entitle Wong Sun to object to its use at his trial. Pp. 371 U. S. 491-492.

7. Any references to Wong Sun in his codefendant’s statement were incompetent to corroborate Wong Sun’s admissions, and Wong Sun is entitled to a new trial, because it is not clear from the record whether or not the trial court relied upon his codefendant’s statement as a source of corroboration of Wong Sun’s confession. Pp. 371 U. S. 492-493.

288 F.2d 366, reversed and cause remanded.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)

Written by Street Cop Training on April 12, 2022. Posted in Case Law.

Syllabus

WHREN ET AL. v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 95-5841. Argued April 17, 1996-Decided June 10, 1996

Plainclothes policemen patrolling a “high drug area” in an unmarked vehicle observed a truck driven by petitioner Brown waiting at a stop sign at an intersection for an unusually long time; the truck then turned suddenly, without signaling, and sped off at an “unreasonable” speed. The officers stopped the vehicle, assertedly to warn the driver about traffic violations, and upon approaching the truck observed plastic bags of crack cocaine in petitioner Whren’s hands. Petitioners were arrested. Prior to trial on federal drug charges, they moved for suppression of the evidence, arguing that the stop had not been justified by either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe petitioners were engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity, and that the officers’ traffic-violation ground for approaching the truck was pretextual. The motion to suppress was denied, petitioners were convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: The temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist absent some additional law enforcement objective. Pp. 809-819.

(a) Detention of a motorist is reasonable where probable cause exists to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. See, e. g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 659. Petitioners claim that, because the police may be tempted to use commonly occurring traffic violations as means of investigating violations of other laws, the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be whether a reasonable officer would have stopped the car for the purpose of enforcing the traffic violation at issue. However, this Court’s cases foreclose the argument that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct justified on the basis of probable cause. See, e. g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 221, n. 1,236. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. Pp. 809-813.

(b) Although framed as an empirical question-whether the officer’s conduct deviated materially from standard police practices-petitioners’ proposed test is plainly designed to combat the perceived danger of pretextual stops. It is thus inconsistent with this Court’s cases, which

807

make clear that the Fourth Amendment’s concern with “reasonableness” allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent. See, e. g., Robinson, supra, at 236. Nor can the Fourth Amendment’s protections be thought to vary from place to place and from time to time, which would be the consequence of assessing the reasonableness of police conduct in light of local law enforcement practices. Pp. 813-816.

(c) Also rejected is petitioners’ argument that the balancing of interests inherent in Fourth Amendment inquiries does not support enforcement of minor traffic laws by plainclothes police in unmarked vehicles, since that practice only minimally advances the government’s interest in traffic safety while subjecting motorists to inconvenience, confusion, and anxiety. Where probable cause exists, this Court has found it necessary to engage in balancing only in cases involving searches or seizures conducted in a manner unusually harmful to the individual. See, e. g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1. The making of a traffic stop out of uniform does not remotely qualify as such an extreme practice. pp. 816-819.

53 F.3d 371, affirmed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Lisa Burget Wright argued the cause for petitioners.

With her on the briefs were A. J. Kramer, Neil H. Jaffee, and G. Allen Dale.

James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States.

On the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Paul A. Engelmayer. *

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Steven R. Shapiro and Susan N. Herman; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Natman Schaye and Walter B. Nash III.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson; and for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Joan Killeen and Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, and Christina V. Kuo, Deputy Attorney General; and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: M. Jane Brady of Delaware,

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)

Written by Street Cop Training on April 12, 2022. Posted in Case Law.

Syllabus

On the night of April 24, 1978, a witness observed a car that was being driven erratically and that eventually swerved off the road, coming to a stop in a field without causing damage to any person or property. Ignoring the witness’ suggestion that he wait for assistance in removing his car, the driver walked away from the scene. The police arrived a few minutes later, and were told by the witness that the driver was either very inebriated or very sick. After checking the car’s registration, the police, without obtaining a warrant, proceeded to the petitioner’s nearby home, arriving at about 9 p.m. They gained entry when petitioner’s stepdaughter answered the door, and found petitioner lying naked in bed. Petitioner was then arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of a Wisconsin statute which provided that a first offense was a noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding for a maximum fine of $200. Petitioner was taken to the police station, where he refused to submit to a breathanalysis test. Pursuant to Wisconsin statutes, which subjected an arrestee who refused to take the test to the risk of a 60-day revocation of driving privileges, petitioner requested a court hearing to determine whether his refusal was reasonable. Under Wisconsin law, a refusal to take a breath test was reasonable if the underlying arrest was not lawful. The trial court, ultimately concluding that petitioner’s arrest was lawful and that his refusal to take the breath test was therefore unreasonable, issued an order suspending petitioner’s license. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals vacated the order, concluding that the warrantless arrest of petitioner in his home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed.

Held: The warrantless, nighttime entry of petitioner’s home to arrest him for a civil, nonjailable traffic offense, was prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 466 U. S. 748-754.

(a) Before government agents may invade the sanctity of the home, the government must demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. An important factor to be considered when determining

Page 466 U. S. 741

whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed, application of the exigent circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense has been committed. Pp. 466 U. S. 748-753.

(b) Petitioner’s warrantless arrest in the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal traffic offense cannot be justified on the basis of the “hot pursuit” doctrine, because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime, or on the basis of a threat to public safety, because petitioner had already arrived home and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident. Nor can the arrest be justified as necessary to preserve evidence of petitioner’s blood alcohol level. Even assuming that the underlying facts would support a finding of this exigent circumstance, given the fact that the State had chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment was possible, a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the petitioner’s blood alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant. Pp. 466 U. S. 753-754.

108 Wis.2d 319, 321 N.W.2d 245, vacated and remanded.

BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and O’CONNOR, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 466 U. S. 755. BURGER, C.J., filed a separate statement, post, p. 466 U. S. 755. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 466 U. S. 756.

Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008)

Written by Street Cop Training on April 12, 2022. Posted in Case Law.

certiorari to the supreme court virginia

No. 06–1082. Argued January 14, 2008—Decided April 23, 2008

Rather than issuing the summons required by Virginia law, police arrested respondent Moore for the misdemeanor of driving on a suspended license. A search incident to the arrest yielded crack cocaine, and Moore was tried on drug charges. The trial court declined to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Moore was convicted. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the arresting officers should have issued a citation under state law, and the Fourth Amendment does not permit search incident to citation.

Held: The police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they made an arrest that was based on probable cause but prohibited by state law, or when they performed a search incident to the arrest. Pp. 3–13.

(a) Because the founding era’s statutes and common law do not support Moore’s view that the Fourth Amendment was intended to incorporate statutes, this is “not a case in which the claimant can point to a ‘clear answer [that] existed in 1791 and has been generally adhered to by the traditions of our society ever since,’ ” Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 345. Pp. 3–5.

(b) Where history provides no conclusive answer, this Court has analyzed a search or seizure in light of traditional reasonableness standards “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295, 300. Applying that methodology, this Court has held that when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime, the arrest is constitutionally reasonable. Atwater, supra, at 354. This Court’s decisions counsel against changing the calculus when a State chooses to protect privacy beyond the level required by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 35. United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, distinguished. Pp. 6–8.

(c) The Court adheres to this approach because an arrest based on probable cause serves interests that justify seizure. Arrest ensures that a suspect appears to answer charges and does not continue a crime, and it safeguards evidence and enables officers to conduct an in-custody investigation. A State’s choice of a more restrictive search-and-seizure policy does not render less restrictive ones unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional. While States are free to require their officers to engage in nuanced determinations of the need for arrest as a matter of their own law, the Fourth Amendment should reflect administrable bright-line rules. Incorporating state arrest rules into the Constitution would make Fourth Amendment protections as complex as the underlying state law, and variable from place to place and time to time. Pp. 8–11.

(d) The Court rejects Moore’s argument that even if the Constitution allowed his arrest, it did not allow the arresting officers to search him. Officers may perform searches incident to constitutionally permissible arrests in order to ensure their safety and safeguard evidence. United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218. While officers issuing citations do not face the same danger, and thus do not have the same authority to search, Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, the officers arrested Moore, and therefore faced the risks that are “an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justification,” Robinson, supra, at 235. Pp. 11–13.

272 Va. 717, 636 S. E. 2d 395, reversed and remanded.

Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. (2016)

Written by Street Cop Training on April 12, 2022. Posted in Case Law.

Syllabus

UTAH v. STRIEFF

certiorari to the supreme court of utah

No. 14–1373. Argued February 22, 2016—Decided June 20, 2016

Narcotics detective Douglas Fackrell conducted surveillance on a South Salt Lake City residence based on an anonymous tip about drug activity. The number of people he observed making brief visits to the house over the course of a week made him suspicious that the occupants were dealing drugs. After observing respondent Edward Strieff leave the residence, Officer Fackrell detained Strieff at a nearby parking lot, identifying himself and asking Strieff what he was doing at the house. He then requested Strieff’s identification and relayed the information to a police dispatcher, who informed him that Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. Officer Fackrell arrested Strieff, searched him, and found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Strieff moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was derived from an unlawful investigatory stop. The trial court denied the motion, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, however, and ordered the evidence suppressed.

Held: The evidence Officer Fackrell seized incident to Strieff’s arrest is admissible based on an application of the attenuation factors from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 . In this case, there was no flagrant police misconduct. Therefore, Officer Fackrell’s discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unconstitutional investigatory stop and the evidence seized incident to a lawful arrest. Pp. 4–10.

(a) As the primary judicial remedy for deterring Fourth Amendment violations, the exclusionary rule encompasses both the “primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure” and, relevant here, “evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality.” Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796 . But to ensure that those deterrence benefits are not outweighed by the rule’s substantial social costs, there are several exceptions to the rule. One exception is the attenuation doctrine, which provides for admissibility when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is sufficiently remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U. S. 586 . Pp. 4–5.

(b) As a threshold matter, the attenuation doctrine is not limited to the defendant’s independent acts. The doctrine therefore applies here, where the intervening circumstance is the discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant. Assuming, without deciding, that Officer Fackrell lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Strieff initially, the discovery of that arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from Strieff incident to his arrest. Pp. 5–10.

(1) Three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 , lead to this conclusion. The first, “temporal proximity” between the initially unlawful stop and the search, id., at 603, favors suppressing the evidence. Officer Fackrell discovered drug contraband on Strieff only minutes after the illegal stop. In contrast, the second factor, “the presence of intervening circumstances, id., at 603–604, strongly favors the State. The existence of a valid warrant, predating the investigation and entirely unconnected with the stop, favors finding sufficient attenuation between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence. That warrant authorized Officer Fackrell to arrest Strieff, and once the arrest was authorized, his search of Strieff incident to that arrest was undisputedly lawful. The third factor, “the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct,” id., at 604, also strongly favors the State. Officer Fackrell was at most negligent, but his errors in judgment hardly rise to a purposeful or flagrant violation of Strieff’s Fourth Amendment rights. After the unlawful stop, his conduct was lawful, and there is no indication that the stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct. Pp. 6–9.

(2) Strieff’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, neither Officer Fackrell’s purpose nor the flagrancy of the violation rises to a level of misconduct warranting suppression. Officer Fackrell’s purpose was not to conduct a suspicionless fishing expedition but was to gather information about activity inside a house whose occupants were legitimately suspected of dealing drugs. Strieff conflates the standard for an illegal stop with the standard for flagrancy, which requires more than the mere absence of proper cause. Second, it is unlikely that the prevalence of outstanding warrants will lead to dragnet searches by police. Such misconduct would expose police to civil liability and, in any event, is already accounted for by Brown’s “purpose and flagrancy” factor. Pp. 9–10.

2015 UT 2, 357 P. 3d 532, reversed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III. Kagan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined.

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)

Written by Street Cop Training on April 12, 2022. Posted in Case Law.

Syllabus

A postal inspector received from an informant of known reliability a stolen credit card that respondent had given the informant to be used for their mutual advantage, and the inspector was told by the informant that respondent had agreed to furnish additional cards. At the inspector’s suggestion, a meeting was arranged between the informant and respondent for a few days later, which took place at a restaurant. Upon a prearranged signal from the informant that respondent had the additional cards, postal officers made a warrantless arrest of respondent, removed him from the restaurant, and gave him Miranda warnings. When a search of respondent’s person revealed no cards, a consented search of his nearby car (after respondent had been cautioned that the results could be used against him) revealed two additional cards in the names of other persons. Following an unsuccessful motion to suppress, these cards were used as evidence in respondent’s trial, which resulted in his conviction of possessing stolen mail. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the Fourth Amendment prohibited use of that evidence because (1) notwithstanding probable cause for respondent’s arrest, the arrest was unconstitutional because the postal inspector had failed to secure an arrest warrant though he had time to do so, and (2) based on the totality of the circumstances (including the illegality of the arrest), respondent’s consent to the car search was coerced and thus, invalid.

Held:

1. The arrest of respondent, having been based on probable cause and made by postal officers acting in strict compliance with the governing statute and regulations, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 423 U. S. 414-424.

2. Since the arrest comported with the Fourth Amendment, respondent’s consent to the car search was not, contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals, the product of an illegal arrest, nor were there any other circumstances indicating that respondent’s consent was not his own “essentially free and unconstrained

Page 423 U. S. 412

choice” because his “will ha[d] been . . . overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired,” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 412 U. S. 225. Pp. 423 U. S. 424 425.

504 F.2d 849, reversed.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 423 U. S. 425. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 423 U. S. 433. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 423 U. S. 433. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

United States v Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989)

Written by Street Cop Training on April 12, 2022. Posted in Case Law.

Syllabus

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents stopped respondent upon his arrival at Honolulu International Airport. The agents found 1,063 grams of cocaine in his carry-on luggage. When respondent was stopped, the agents knew, inter alia, that (1) he paid $2,100 for two round-trip plane tickets from a roll of $20 bills; (2) he traveled under a name that did not match the name under which his telephone number was listed; (3) his original destination was Miami, a source city for illicit drugs; (4) he stayed in Miami for only 48 hours, even though a round-trip flight from Honolulu to Miami takes 20 hours; (5) he appeared nervous during his trip; and (6) he checked none of his luggage. Respondent was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The District Court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the stop was justified by a reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity, as required by the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed respondent’s conviction, applying a two-part test for determining reasonable suspicion. First, ruled the court, at least one fact describing “ongoing criminal activity” — such as the use of an alias or evasive movement through an airport — was always necessary to support a reasonable suspicion finding. Second, “probabilistic” facts describing “personal characteristics” of drug couriers — such as the cash payment for tickets, a short trip to a major source city for drugs, nervousness, type of attire, and unchecked luggage — were only relevant if there was evidence of “ongoing criminal activity” and the Government

Page 490 U. S. 2

offered “[e]mpirical documentation” that the combination of facts at issue did not describe the behavior of “significant numbers of innocent persons.” The Court of Appeals held the agents’ stop impermissible, because there was no evidence of ongoing criminal behavior in this case.

Held: On the facts of this case, the DEA agents had a reasonable suspicion that respondent was transporting illegal drugs when they stopped him. Pp. 490 U. S. 7-11.

(a) Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 392 U. S. 30, the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if they have a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity “may be afoot,” even if they lack probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification for making a stop — that is, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,” but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause. P. 490 U. S. 7.

(b) The Court of Appeals’ two-part test creates unnecessary difficulty in dealing with one of the relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment. Under this Court’s decisions, the totality of the circumstances must be evaluated to determine the probability, rather than the certainty, of criminal conduct. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 449 U. S. 417. The Court of Appeals’ test draws an unnecessarily sharp line between types of evidence, the probative value of which varies only in degree. While traveling under an alias or taking an evasive path through an airport may be highly probative, neither type of evidence has the sort of ironclad significance attributed to it by the Court of Appeals, because there are instances in which neither factor would reflect ongoing criminal activity. On the other hand, the test’s “probabilistic” factors also have probative significance. Paying $2,100 in cash for airline tickets from a roll of $20 bills containing nearly twice that amount is not ordinary conduct for most business travelers or vacationers. The evidence that respondent was traveling under an alias, although not conclusive, was sufficient to warrant consideration. Of similar effect is the probability that few Honolulu residents travel for 20 hours to spend 48 hours in Miami during July. Thus, although each of these factors is not, by itself, proof of illegal conduct, and is quite consistent with innocent travel, taken together, they amount to reasonable suspicion that criminal conduct was afoot. Pp. 490 U. S. 7-10.

(c) The fact that the agents believed that respondent’s behavior was consistent with one of the DEA’s “drug courier profiles” does not alter this analysis, because the factors in question have evidentiary significance regardless of whether they are set forth in a “profile.” P. 490 U. S. 10.

(d) The reasonableness of the decision to stop does not, as respondent contends, turn upon whether the police used the least intrusive means

Page 490 U. S. 3

available to verify or dispel their suspicions. Such a rule would unduly hamper the officers’ ability to make on-the-spot decisions — here, respondent was about to enter a taxicab — and would require courts to indulge in unrealistic second-guessing. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 460 U. S. 495, distinguished. Pp. 490 U. S. 10-11.

831 F.2d 1413, reversed and remanded.

REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O’CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post,p. 490 U. S. 11.

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985)

Written by Street Cop Training on April 12, 2022. Posted in Case Law.

Syllabus

A Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, while patrolling a highway in an area under surveillance for suspected drug trafficking, noticed an apparently overloaded pickup truck with an attached camper traveling in tandem with a Pontiac. Respondent Savage was driving the truck, and respondent Sharpe was driving the Pontiac. After following the two vehicles for about 20 miles, the agent decided to make an “investigative stop,” and radioed the South Carolina State Highway Patrol for assistance. An officer responded, and he and the DEA agent continued to follow the two vehicles. When they attempted to stop the vehicles, the Pontiac pulled over to the side of the road, but the truck continued on, pursued by the state officer. After identifying himself and obtaining identification from Sharpe, the DEA agent attempted to radio the State Highway Patrol officer. The DEA agent was unable to contact the state officer to see if he had stopped the truck, so he radioed the local police for help. In the meantime, the state officer had stopped the truck, questioned Savage, and told him that he would be held until the DEA agent arrived. The agent, who had left the local police with the Pontiac, arrived at the scene approximately 15 minutes after the truck had been stopped. After confirming his suspicion that the truck was overloaded and upon smelling marihuana, the agent opened the rear of the camper without Savage’s permission and observed a number of burlap-wrapped bales resembling bales of marihuana that the agent had seen in previous investigations. The agent then placed Savage under arrest and, returning to the Pontiac, also arrested Sharpe. Chemical tests later showed that the bales contained marihuana. Respondents were charged with federal drug offenses, and, after the District Court denied their motion to suppress the contraband, were convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, because the investigative stops failed to meet the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of brevity governing detentions on less than probable cause, the marihuana should have been suppressed as the fruit of unlawful seizures.

Held: The detention of Savage clearly met the Fourth Amendment’s standard of reasonableness. Pp. 470 U. S. 682-688.

(a) In evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop, this Court examines

“whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances

Page 470 U. S. 676

which justified the interference in the first place.”

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 392 U. S. 20. As to the first part of the inquiry, the Court of Appeals assumed that the officers had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that respondents were engaged in marihuana trafficking, and the record abundantly supports that assumption, given the circumstances when the officers attempted to stop the Pontiac and the truck. As to the second part of the inquiry, while the brevity of an investigative detention is an important factor in determining whether the detention is unreasonable, courts must also consider the purposes to be served by the stop, as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes. The Court of Appeals’ decision would effectively establish a per se rule that a 20-minute detention is too long to be justified under the Terry doctrine. Such a result is clearly and fundamentally at odds with this Court’s approach in this area. Pp. 682-686.

(b) In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, it is appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. Here, the DEA agent diligently pursued his investigation, and clearly no delay unnecessary to the investigation was involved. Pp. 470 U. S. 686-688.

712 F.2d 65, reversed and remanded.

BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O’CONNOR, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 470 U. S. 688. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 470 U. S. 688. BRENNAN, J., post, p. 470 U. S. 702, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 470 U. S. 721, filed dissenting opinions.

United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976)

Written by Street Cop Training on April 12, 2022. Posted in Case Law.

Syllabus

On the basis of information that respondent Santana had in her possession marked money used to make a heroin “buy” arranged by an undercover agent, police officers went to Santana’s house where she was standing in the doorway holding a paper bag, but, as the officers approached, she retreated into the vestibule of her house, where they caught her. When she tried to escape, envelopes containing what was later determined to be heroin fell to the floor from the paper bag, and she was found to have been carrying some of the marked money on her person. Respondent Alejandro, who had been sitting on the front steps, was caught when he tried to make off with the dropped envelopes of heroin. After their indictment for possessing heroin with intent to distribute, respondents moved to suppress the heroin and marked money. The District Court granted the motion on the ground that, although the officers had probable cause to make the arrests, Santana’s retreat into the vestibule did not justify a warrantless entry into the house on the ground of “hot pursuit.” The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held:

1. Santana, while standing in the doorway of her house, was in a “public place” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, since she was not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy, and was not merely visible to the public, but was exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been standing completely outside her house. Thus, when the police, who concededly had probable cause to do so, sought to arrest her, they merely intended to make a warrantless arrest in a public place upon probable cause, and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 . P. 427 U. S. 42

2. By retreating into a private place, Santana could not defeat an otherwise proper arrest that had been set in motion in a public place. Since there was a need to act quickly to prevent destruction of evidence, there was a true “hot pursuit,” which need not be an extended hue and cry “in and about [the] public streets,” and thus a warrantless entry to make the arrest was

Page 427 U. S. 39

justified, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, as was the search incident to that arrest. Pp. 427 U. S. 42-43.

Reversed.

REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 427 U. S. 43. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which STEWART, J., joined, post, p. 427 U. S. 44. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 427 U. S. 45.

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)

Written by Street Cop Training on April 12, 2022. Posted in Case Law.

Syllabus

Acting on information from an informant that a described individual was selling narcotics kept in the trunk of a certain car parked at a specified location, District of Columbia police officers immediately drove to the location, found the car there, and, a short while later, stopped the car and arrested the driver (respondent), who matched the informant’s description. One of the officers opened the car’s trunk, found a closed brown paper bag, and after opening the bag, discovered glassine bags containing white powder (later determined to be heroin). The officer then drove the car to headquarters, where another warrantless search of the trunk revealed a zippered leather pouch containing cash. Respondent was subsequently convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute — the heroin and currency found in the searches having been introduced in evidence after respondent’s pretrial motion to suppress the evidence had been denied. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, while the officers had probable cause to stop and search respondent’s car — including its trunk — without a warrant, they should not have opened either the paper bag or the leather pouch found in the trunk without first obtaining a warrant.

Held: Police officers who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed somewhere within it may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could authorize by warrant. Pp. 456 U. S. 804-825.

(a) The “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement established in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, applies to searches of vehicles that are supported by probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. In this class of cases, a search is not unreasonable if based on objective facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been obtained. Pp. 456 U. S. 804-809.

(b) However, the rationale justifying the automobile exception does not apply so as to permit a warrantless search of any movable container that is believed to be carrying an illicit substance and that is found in a public place even when the container is placed in a vehicle (not otherwise believed to be carrying contraband). United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753. Pp. 456 U. S. 809-814.

Page 456 U. S. 799

(c) Where police officers have probable cause to search an entire vehicle, they may conduct a warrantless search of every part of the vehicle and its contents, including all containers and packages, that may conceal the object of the search. The scope of the search is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. For example, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase. Pp. 456 U. S. 817-824.

(d) The doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude rejection here of the holding in Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, and some of the reasoning in Arkansas v. Sanders, supra. Pp. 456 U. S. 824-825.

210 U.S.App.D.C. 342, 655 F.2d 1159, reversed and remanded.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O’CONNOR, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 456 U. S. 825, and POWELL, J., post, p. 456 U. S. 826, filed concurring opinions. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion,post, p. 456 U. S. 826. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 456 U. S. 827.